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Abstract
Background: Accounting for 36% of public spending on health care in Canada, hospitals are a major target for
cost reductions through various efficiency initiatives. Some provinces are considering payment reform as a vehicle
to achieve this goal. With few exceptions, Canadian provinces have generally relied on global and line-item
budgets to contain hospital costs. There is growing interest amongst policy-makers for using activity based funding
(ABF) as means of creating financial incentives for hospitals to increase the ‘volume’ of care, reduce cost,
discourage unnecessary activity, and encourage competition. British Columbia (B.C.) is the first province in Canada
to implement ABF for partial reimbursement of acute hospitalization. To date, there have been no formal
examinations of the effects of ABF policies in Canada.
This study proposal addresses two research questions designed to determine whether ABF policies affect health
system costs, access and hospital quality. The first question examines the impact of the hospital funding policy
change on internal hospital activity based on expenditures and quality. The second question examines the impact
of the change on non-hospital care, including readmission rates, amount of home care provided, and physician
expenditures.
Methods/Design: A longitudinal study design will be used, incorporating comprehensive population-based
datasets of all B.C. residents; hospital, continuing care and physician services datasets will also be used. Data will be
linked across sources using anonymized linking variables. Analytic datasets will be created for the period between
2005/2006 and 2012/2013.
Discussion: With Canadian hospitals unaccustomed to detailed scrutiny of what services are provided, to whom,
and with what results, the move toward ABF is significant. This proposed study will provide evidence on the
impacts of ABF, including changes in the type, volume, cost, and quality of services provided. Policy- and decision-
makers in B.C. and elsewhere in Canada will be able to use this evidence as a basis for policy adaptations and
modifications. The significance of this proposed study derives from the fact that the change in hospital funding
policy has the potential to affect health system costs, residents’ access to care and care quality.
Background
Accounting for $46-billion - or 36% of public spending
on health care [1] - hospitals are a major target for cost
reductions through efficiency initiatives in Canada.
Some provinces are considering payment reform as a
vehicle to achieve this goal. The use of financial incen-
tives to increase hospital efficiency is now widespread in
Europe and has occurred in the United States (US)
since 1983 [2-4]; however, the approach remains largely
untested in Canada [5].
In April 2010, the British Columbia (B.C.) provincial
government implemented activity based funding (ABF)
for hospitals, marking a fundamental change to the
method of funding acute hospital care. ABF will direct
up to 20% of available funds to acute hospitals on the
basis of types and volume of services. This change is sig-
nificant in an industry accustomed to historically-based
global budgets and unaccustomed to detailed scrutiny of
what services are provided to B.C.’s 4.5 million residents
and at what cost.
While this change in hospital funding is being imple-
mented in B.C., a debate over the relative merits of
hospital ABF is unfolding across Canada [6,7]. For
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C. Medical Association have recently staked positions
supportive of ABF [8-10], although support for ABF
among the medical community is mixed [11,12]. The
Canadian Nurses Associations u p p o r t sa ni n c r e a s i n g
emphasis on output measurement [13] but falls short
of endorsing ABF, while other groups are calling for
more comprehensive baseline data [14]. Although
there has been no formal examination of the effects of
ABF policies in Canada - in part because B.C. is the
first province to adopt ABF for acute hospitals on a
large scale - several other provinces are considering
adopting similar funding models.
This project will provide an evidence base on the
impacts of ABF, including changes in the type, volume,
cost, and quality of services provided. Policy- and deci-
sion-makers in B.C. and elsewhere in Canada will be
able to use this evidence as a basis for policy adaptations
and modifications.
Rationale
What is Activity Based Funding?
In B.C., regional Health Authorities (HA) are responsi-
ble for providing health services to their region’s
population. The HAs derive their operating revenue
from multiple sources, though the vast majority is
provided by the provincial government [15,5]. Provin-
cial funds are allocated to HAs through a mix of: 1)
block operating grants (which are historically- and
population-based, independent of the volume and type
of activity provided to the region’s residents), 2) tar-
geted line items linked to specific policy objectives,
and 3) to a very minor degree, pay for performance
initiatives [16]. Health authorities then allocate from
their block grants to the various community-based
providers (excluding physicians) in their regions, with
a significant portion of those resources going to acute
care hospitals.
ABF is a variant of fee-for-service in which funds are
allocated based on the volume and type of services
provided, including considerations of patient case-mix.
ABF is an alternative to the traditional Canadian block
operating grant funding for hospitals but has been
widely used outside of Canada for some time now [2-4].
A small-scale implementation in Canada was abandoned
by the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
[17] in 2007 due to poor data quality [18,19] and lack of
support across affected stakeholders. In the B.C.
program, as an addition to a base block grant, a portion
of hospital funding will flow based on the number of
cases, with remuneration adjusted for the mix of patient
diagnoses and the services and procedures provided to
those patients.
Information Base for Supporting ABF
The success of ABF is critically linked to the ability to
measure ‘weighted’ hospital output accurately. Methods
for characterizing hospital output according to the
patients’ mix of clinical conditions and interventions
have become common and are known as case mix
adjustments. The most popular method is diagnosis
related groups, or DRGs [20], though variants of DRG
have been developed, each customized to address local
policy and health delivery characteristics and objectives
[21,22]. In Canada, all acute inpatient discharge data
submitted to the Canadian Institute for Health Informa-
tion’s (CIHI) Discharge Abstract Database (DAD) are
case-mix-adjusted using their Case Mix Group (CMG+)
methodology [23]. Case mix adjustment is important
since it weights hospital discharges according to their
expected relative use of resources (and therefore cost).
Each CMG+’s expected relative cost is represented by a
resource intensity weight (RIW). As the length of stay
has no bearing on the RIW value assigned (with minor
exceptions for patients with exceptionally long lengths
of stay), the incentive is to shorten lengths of stay in
order to keep actual costs below the RIW-based case-
specific relative amounts.
The veracity of weighting hospital output by RIW is con-
tingent on accurately reported clinical data. CIHI’s clinical
chart re-abstractions have shown that Canadian hospitals
have modified their clinical coding behaviour to maximize
RIWs even in the absence of direct financial incentives to
do so [18,19]. This behavior introduces an additional chal-
lenge to our study and requires us to be able to differenti-
ate actual changes in activity mix as a result of the
changing financial incentives from apparent changes in
activity mix that are merely shifts in coding practices.
Gaps in knowledge
The introduction of payment tied to particular types of
activity represents a major change in hospital payment
policy in Canada. We lack a knowledge base in Canada
regarding the actual effects of these policies; and the
(also relatively sparse) lessons from other health care
systems cannot be necessarily generalized to the Cana-
dian context. The natural experiment that is unfolding
in B.C. thus provides an important opportunity to exam-
ine whether the theoretical incentive effects of ABF for
hospitals, tied to efficiencies sought by B.C.’s Ministry of
Health Services (MoHS), will actually materialize.
This project also provides a first-ever opportunity to
examine the subsequent impact of ABF on the non-hos-
pital sector. From a policy perspective, our results will
provide as close to real-time impact information to B.C.
decision makers as is possible in the world of health ser-
vices research regarding the effects of ABF on costs,
quality and access to care for residents.
Sutherland et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:150
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/150
Page 2 of 8Study Objective
The primary objective of this study is to examine the
impact of ABF on acute care hospitals and related ser-
vices in B.C. This objective will be fulfilled by meeting
two specific aims.
Aim 1: To measure internal (to the hospital) changes
resulting from the shift toward ABF. In a longitudinal
analysis of observational data, we will measure whether
and how hospitals respond to the changed financial
incentives. Related hypotheses include:
Hypothesis 1.1: Lengths of stay will decrease and
case mix adjusted volume of patients will increase
from baseline levels. We will test for changes in
trend over time.
Hypothesis 1.2: There will be changes in in-hospital
quality measures (mortality and adverse events) for
specific conditions that are characterized by their
variability in clinical utilization patterns. We will test
for changes in trend over time.
Hypothesis 1.3: Hospitals’ expenditures will increase
from baseline levels. We will construct a model to
detect changes in trend over time of hospital
expenditures.
Aim 2: To measure external (to the hospital) changes.
In a longitudinal analysis of observational data, we will
measure whether other components of the health care
system are affected by the shift toward ABF. Related
hypotheses include:
Hypothesis 2.1: There will be an increase in 30 day
readmission rate, rate of admissions from emergency
department (ED) and rate of admissions for ambula-
tory sensitive conditions, all indicators of sub-opti-
mal acute care. We will test for an increase in the
rates over time.
Hypothesis 2.2: There will be an increase in the
number of new home care patients subsequent to
being discharged from acute care. We will construct
a model to detect changes in the trend of: 1) new
home care patients over time and 2) readmissions to
acute care from home care over time.
Hypothesis 2.3: There will be an increase in expen-
ditures on physician services. We will test for an
increase in physician expenditures over time.
Methods/Design
Design
This study has been approved by the University of Brit-
ish Columbia’s Research Ethics Board.
Aim 1
We do not expect ABF to affect all patient types uni-
formly. Conditions for which patterns of care are well
defined are expected to be invariant to hospital funding
incentives. Accordingly, we will map all hospitalizations
into one of three 3 care types; supply sensitive care, pre-
ference sensitive care and evidence-based care. The ratio-
nale for stratifying analyses into these 3 categories is
that utilization intensity has been shown to vary by con-
dition, region and clinician preference [24]. For each
s t r a t u m ,t h ec h a n g ei nt h ea v e r a g el e n g t ho fs t a ya n d
number of discharges is expected to vary (as shown in
the 2
nd column of Table 1).
In addition to overall case mix adjusted volume and
day surgery volume, we will calculate average lengths of
stay for case mix adjusted volume of patients for each
condition listed in the third column of Table 1. We will
use ICD-10-CA codes underlying the CMG; a strategy
for identifying hospitalizations that ensures that the con-
ditions identified in Table 1 are the primary reason for
hospitalization (and removes patients whose hospitaliza-
tion is for reasons other than those listed).
In-hospital quality and outcomes as a result of a shift
to ABF will be monitored in B.C. and shared with the
MoHS. Based on broadly accepted in-hospital quality
indicators [25], our hospital quality indicators will be
mortality rates for selected medical and surgical patients
(shown in Table 2), overall mortality rates plus the
number of patient safety and adverse events [26].
Hospital mortality rates will be calculated as the num-
ber of inpatient deaths relative to the number of separa-
tions for the conditions listed in Table 2. Methods for
calculating mortality rates for surgical patients are based
on the Leapfrog Group’s evidence-based hospital referral
(EBHR) standards for surgery, while mortality rates for
medical conditions are based on low mortality patient
Table 1 Expected response of hospitals to ABF by type of
care provided
Care Type Expected
Response
Reason for
Hospitalization
Supply Sensitive Some Response Congestive heart failure
Cancer
Chronic lung disease
Preference
Sensitive
Unknown Benign prostatic
hypertrophy
Hip replacement
Knee replacement
Evidence-based
Care
None Appendectomy
Leg fracture
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come. We will adjust hospital mortality rates for differ-
ences between hospitals of age, sex and risk profiles of
patients [28,29].
We will also calculate in-hospital event rates,
representing unintended injuries or complications of
care [30] per volume of surgical separations and ana-
lyze changes in trend over time. These rates include:
post operative sepsis (surgical site infection); post
operative thrombo-embolism; and repeat trips to the
OR. These quality indicators are commonly applied
and can be readily computed with B.C.’s hospital
separation data.
Finally, we will adjust hospital expenditure data to
control for factors associated with price inflation over
time, such as labour contract increases, in order to iso-
late ABF-related changes in expenditures.
Aim 2
Since all segments of the health care system are inter-
twined, even if funding streams are not, this study pro-
vides a first-ever opportunity to develop knowledge
regarding the non-hospital consequences of ABF. To
examine health system effects, we will calculate three
categories of indicators: early discharge from hospital
(resulting in readmission to hospital); access to care; and
(inappropriate) admissions for ambulatory care sensitive
conditions (see Table 3).
Using hospital data for all three categories of indica-
tors, we will measure the association between rates of
acute hospital readmissions and ABF. We will look for
evidence of a change in 30 day hospital readmission
rates for all causes, acute myocardial infarction (AMI)
and prostatectomy discharges. Risk adjusted AMI read-
mission rate has been linked to the types of drugs pre-
scribed at discharge, post-discharge therapies and the
quality of follow-up care, whereas prostatectomy read-
mission rates provide one measure of follow up care
[31,32]. These indicators are often used to signal too-
early discharge. We will use ICD-10-CA diagnosis and
Canadian Classification of Health Interventions (CCI)
procedure codes to identify patients.
We will calculate indicators of system level effects on
access: the rate of admissions from emergency depart-
ment and the risk-adjusted rate of hip fracture in
patients aged 65 and older who underwent hip fracture
surgery on the day of admission or the next day.
Increases in hospitals’ emergency department utilization
are linked to (less) availability of out-of-hospital care
while delayed hip fracture surgery has been associated
with a lack of resources, physician unavailability and
other issues related to access to care [31].
We will calculate rates of hospital admissions for two
ambulatory sensitive conditions: dehydration [33] and
diabetes mellitus [33]. We believe changes in these rates
are important signals of care quality and potentially
negative implications for quality of life [34]. We are
selecting these two conditions due to their broad use
plus our ability to derive these indicators from B.C.’s
hospital separation data. We will use the ICD-10-CA
diagnoses to identify these patients.
Previous studies have not rigorously examined the
non-hospital effects of changing acute hospital payment
methods, and it is not known how the change to ABF
will affect the demand for home care or the ability to
maintain high quality home care services. We will
Table 2 Conditions for calculating age, sex and risk
adjusted in-hospital mortality rates
Type Title Method for Identifying Cases
Medical Acute myocardial infarction ICD-10-CA codes
Congestive heart failure
Stroke
Gastrointestinal hemorrhage
Pneumonia
Surgical Esophageal resection CCI codes
Pancreatic resection
Carotid endarterectomy
Craniotomy
Hip replacement
Table 3 Indicators of early discharge, access and admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions
Impact Condition Level of
Reporting
Readmission All Cause Hospital
Acute myocardial infarction Hospital
Prostatectomy Hospital
Access Emergency department admission rate Hip fracture surgery within 2 days of
admission
Hospital
Hip fracture surgery within 2 days of admission Hospital
Ambulatory care sensitive
conditions
Dehydration: hospital admission rate Health Authority
Diabetes mellitus: hospital admission rate Health Authority
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month using the continuing care dataset, looking retro-
spectively to determine which patients are ‘new’ to
home care as opposed to existing patients. Changes in
the trend of the number of new home care patients will
provide valuable insight into the acuity of patients dis-
charged from acute care. Based on the cohort of home
care patients, we will then calculate the number of read-
missions to acute care from home care over time. This
important signal of care quality may suggest increased
pressure on home care services attributable to ABF.
To date, no published information describes the nat-
ure of change in use of physician services after imple-
mentation of ABF. Medical Services Plan data allow us
to determine the amount of all fee-for-service physician
payments. For each acute discharge, we will link the
amount of physician payments in the 30-day period fol-
lowing the incident discharge (including readmissions).
Total physician expenditures will be linked to hospital
data and registry data to enable our analytic dataset to
be able to be analyzed over time and for specific condi-
tions (see Table 3). To isolate changes of physician utili-
zation from physician payments over time, we will draw
on work currently being undertaken at the Centre for
Health Services and Policy Research (CHSPR) on a sepa-
rate study to remove the effects of fee changes from
physician fees.
Data Resources and Variable Construction
T h ea n a l y t i cd a t a s e tf o rAim 1 (internal to the
hospital) will be derived from acute and outpatient
DAD hospitalizations linked to the registry data. The
dataset will include the following variables: month and
year of discharge, CMG, CIHI-defined age group, hos-
pital, region of residence (HA), length of stay (LOS),
ICD-10-CA codes, indicator of death, and Adjusted
Clinical Groups (a measure of health status [28]). The
number of inpatient separations per year, for the con-
ditions to be studied (Table 1), is expected to exceed
5,000. We will analyze hospital separations over the
period from fiscal year 2005/2006 through to, and
including, 2012/2013, to ensure consistent application
of CMG+ across all years.
We will consider the effect of data quality and com-
pleteness on the results. The most recent multi-stage
randomized studies of DAD data quality, which involve
clinical chart re-abstractions, have been conducted by
C I H Ia n dh a v ef o u n dt h em a j o r i t yo fd a t ae l e m e n t si n
the DAD are accurately reported [35], with comorbid-
ity reporting being an important exception. We will
use the results of these studies to exclude those ICD-
10-CA codes susceptible to being affected by coding
practice changes. Further, we will link Medical Services
Plan data to hospital separation data to evaluate
completeness of reporting (a means to validate proce-
d u r ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h eD A D ) .
One comprehensive analytic dataset will be created for
Aim 2 (external to the hospital) for the years 2005/2006
through 2012/2013. This analytic dataset will be the
product of linking acute hospital, registry and continu-
ing care datasets with summarized physician fee-for-ser-
vice expenditure data. The hospital data will be used to
calculate rates of: readmission, admissions from the
emergency department and ambulatory care sensitive
admissions. The analytic dataset will include admission
date, CMG, hospital, region of residence, ICD-10-CA
codes, procedure date and whether the patient was
admitted from the ED. Readmissions at separate hospi-
tals will be attributed back to the incident hospitaliza-
tion. The analytic dataset will include an indicator
variable to represent incident cases of new home care in
the period immediately following discharge from acute
care. A variable representing the amount of physician
services will be determined from the physician fee-for-
service Medical Services Plan (MSP) data linked to
patient data.
We recognize that approximately 20% of physicians
are not paid by on a fee-for-service basis, so we will
limit our inferences to physicians and expenditures paid
by fee-for-service as we expect salaried physicians to be
less likely to be affected by the incentives of ABF. We
will identify those physicians paid primarily by fee-for-
service using an information resource being developed
at CHSPR for a separate project.
Analysis
Initially, we will provide descriptive analyses of the over-
all trend in provincial LOS and case mix adjusted
volume. We will then construct a multivariate zero-
truncated Poisson regression model to identify factors
associated with length of stay for each condition
included in Table 1. The dependent variable, length of
stay of patient i,i sYi. The regression model effects
include: hospital and patient level effects, Xi, (such as
age and ACG). Hospital level clustering will be incorpo-
rated into the model. The model is:
Yi = Poisson(λi), Yi > 0
log(λi) = α + Xiβ + γ · timei + θ · policyi + τ · policyi · timei
where time and policy (and interaction between time
and policy) represent study month (1,2,3...) and an indi-
cator variable for ABF, respectively.
If the MoHS changes ABF policy during the study
period (e.g., to 30% of acute funding), we will change
the parameterization of the model to reflect the change.
The parameters of interest are θ and τ,w h e r eθ repre-
sents an immediate change in the length of stay and τ
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results will be presented as absolute and relative changes
to facilitate interpretation. While we are confident these
methods are appropriate for the data and the questions
being addressed, if small sample sizes inhibit analysis,
we will explore composite measures (which combine
multiple conditions) for standardized rates [36-38].
We will use a linear regression model to examine the
relationship between ABF and hospitals’ case mix
adjusted volume of cases (transformed for normality if
needed). The dependent variable, Yi,i st h eh o s p i t a l ’s
monthly number of case mix adjusted cases. Repeated
measures (clustering) on hospitals over time will be
incorporated into the model through Xi, a vector of hos-
pital effects. The regression equation is written:
Yi = α + Xiβ + γ · timei + θ · policyi + τ · policyi · timei + ∈i
where the parameters of interest are change in level
(θ) and change in trend (τ). We will construct a regres-
sion model for overall weighted cases plus a separate
regression model for each condition included in Table 1.
We will model the number of in-hospital medical and
surgical deaths, Yi, (as described in Table 2) relative to
the total number of separations, Ni,u s i n gaP o i s s o n
model for count data. The vector Xi will include hospi-
tal effects and adjust for repeated measurements on the
same hospital. The regression model is written:
Yi = Poisson(λiNi)
Ni = Total separations
log(λi) = α + Xiβ + γ · timei + θ · policyi + τ · policyi · timei
The parameters of interest are those associated with
immediate change in the number of deaths (relative to
the number of discharges, Ni) and a change in the trend
of number of deaths. We will explore the use of zero-
inflated Poisson (ZIP) models if we find an abundance
of counts of 0.
Similar to the approaches described above, we will use a
linear regression model (suitably transformed for normal-
ity) to detect changes in hospital expenditures associated
with ABF implementation (including adjustments for
effects of inflation) and controlling for repeated measures
on hospitals.
Following published methods for calculating hospital
readmission rates [31], we will calculate overall readmis-
sion rates using a multivariate Poisson model for count
data, controlling for repeated measures on hospitals. We
will also construct separate models for the conditions
listed in Table 3. The regression models of monthly
hospital readmission rates will include effects for hospi-
tal, time and a binary variable for ABF. The parameters
of interest represent immediate change in readmission
and change in trend over time.
We will use a linear regression model to examine the
relationship between the number of (monthly) new
home care patients and ABF. The unit of observation
will be the number of new home care patients within an
HA and we will control for repeated measures over
time. The effects of primary interest are those associated
with immediate change in new home care patients and a
change in the trend of home care patients. Given stable
monthly count data at the HA-level, we expect to be
powered able to detect moderate and large sized effects.
Similar to the methods described above, we will model
the number of monthly readmissions to acute care from
home care using a Poisson model for count data and
adjust for HA and hospital effects. The parameters of
interest are those associated with immediate change in the
number of readmissions to acute care from home care and
a change in the trend of number of readmissions.
We will also use a log-transformed model to examine
the association between patients’ fee-for-service physi-
cian expenditures (fee-adjusted) over time, and imple-
mentation of ABF. The regression equation for patients’
fee-for-service, fee-adjusted, physician expenditures is
written:
Yi = α + Xiβ + γ · timei + θ · policyi + τ · policyi · timei + ∈i
where the parameters of interest are change in level
(θ) and change in trend (τ). The vector Xi will include
effects to control for repeated measures on physicians
and hospitals plus will adjust for patient level effects,
such as age and comorbidity burden (derived from
CMG).
Discussion
The examination of hospital and non-hospital effects of
the implementation of ABF in B.C. is both critical and
timely given the high public profile of the “sustainabil-
ity” of the health care system, the large cost footprint
represented by acute care hospitals, and the mushroom-
ing interest in ABF across Canada. For the MoHS, the
policy rationale for ABF - to increase hospital efficiency
w h i l eh o l d i n gt h el i n eo na g g r e g a t ee x p e n d i t u r e s-i s
clear: regional HA block operating grants fail to create
the incentives for hospital-derived efficiencies that ABF
may provide.
If B.C.’s policy-makers are to assess the extent to
which their objective of increasing hospital efficiencies
without sacrificing quality has been achieved, it is
critical that they be able to monitor effects of ABF on a
timely basis. While from a policy perspective, this pro-
posed work will help position the MoHS to ensure its
objectives are met, the overall goal of this research is to
examine the impact of ABF not just on hospital activity,
but more broadly on the health care system overall.
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W h i l ew ea r el e v e r a g i n gt h en a t u r a le x p e r i m e n to fas i g -
nificant change in hospital funding, we are limited in the
type of study design we can use. Since the MoHS’ ABF
initiative includes all hospitals, it is not possible to ‘ran-
domize’ hospitals to ABF and non-ABF groups as to iso-
late the effect of the implementation of ABF. We are not
including another province’s hospitals to act as a ‘control’
group due to the potential confounding from reporting
differences between provinces, hospital funding policy
changes in other provinces and the potentially insur-
mountable problems associated with, but undoubtedly
lengthy time required to, securing data access in multiple
provinces. Given these constraints, a longitudinal design
is the strongest possible design. Our study will be limited
to administrative datasets, precluding the use of detailed
clinical data that might inform our analyses.
Potential Contributions and Significance
This project represents a unique opportunity to examine
the health care system during a time of significant policy
change in B.C. that will have implications for health system
funding across Canada. This project will lay a solid founda-
tion upon which to build future projects, including the
development and integration of outcome and quality indica-
tors into health system performance measurement in B.C.
This study represents a unique opportunity to leverage
the natural policy experiment occurring in B.C. and will
contribute to understanding the dynamics underlying
the most significant and expensive segments of our
health care system. By the end of the study, we expect
to propose a series of policy recommendations as they
relate to monitoring health system use within a new fra-
mework for hospital funding. The insight gained from
these activities will be of high value to all Canadians.
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